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DUTY OF LOYALTY
Trusts-The North Carolina Fiduciary Powers Act and the
Duty of Loyalty
I In 1965 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the fidu-
ciary powers act.1 The act contains a list of thirty powers which
are generally desirable in trust and estate management and which
can be conveniently incorporated by reference into a trust instru-
ment.2 More important the draftsman is provided with a clear
guide to powers available to the trustee which will eventually be-
come well defined by case law. Use of the act will undoubtedly
reduce the number of situations in which a trustee fails to act for
fear of exceeding his authority and the necessity of applying to the
court for instructions, often a time consuming and expensive pro-
cess.8 Despite these conveniences the act has created a number of
problems4 arising from the difficulty of striking a proper balance
between the need for adequate powers in the trustee and adequate
protection for the beneficiary. The purpose of this discussion is to
analyze two of the North Carolina trustees' powers in light of tradi-
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32-25 to -27 (1966). For examples of similar legis-
lation see AuK. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-114 to -116 (Supp. 1965) and TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-616 to -618 (Supp. 1966).
'The incorporation by reference type statute should be distinguished
from a statute like the Uniform Trustee's Powers Act under which enume-
rated powers are automatically incorporated into all trust instruments unless
specifically excluded. For a thorough analysis of the latter act see Horowitz,
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, 41 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Horowitz]. To the effect that the incorporation by reference type
statute is inadequate to solve present day administrative problems see
Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 627, 659 (1962).
-'North Carolina is in accord with the well established rule that the
courts will allow the trustee to deviate from the terms of the trust where
due to circumstances not anticipated by the settlor compliance would defeat
or substantially impair the purposes of the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRusTs § 167 (1959). Accord, Trust Co. v. Johnston, 269 N.C. 701, 153
S.E.2d 449 (1967); Bank v. Broyhill, 263 N.C. 189, 139 S.E.2d 214
(1964); Cocke v. Duke Univ., 260 N.C. 1, 131 S.E.2d 909 (1963); Blades
v. Spitzer, 252 N.C. 207, 113 S.E.2d 315 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-26(b) (1966) creates an obvious problem which
is beyond the scope of this discussion. Briefly, this section states that no
power shall be exercised in such a manner as to deprive the trust or estate of
an otherwise available tax exemption. First, it is not at all clear whether an
exercise of power in violation of this provision would render the act of the
trustee void or whether such exercise would constitute a breach of trust.
More important it is not clear whether the Commissioner would honor this
provision as a savings clause for federal estate tax purposes. See note 19
infra for a situation in which this becomes extremely important. For an
analysis of a similar provision in the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act see
Horowitz 13.
1967] 1141
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tional fiduciary principles of loyalty. Through this analysis the possi-
ble consequences of incorporation and the need for thoughtful
draftsmanship will become apparent.
The requirement of loyalty of a trustee is derived from the
most intense fiduciary relationship in our law.5 Basically this duty
requires the trustee to subordinate his personal interests and act
solely in the interest of the beneficiary. Whenever it appears that
the trustee's personal interest may have been a factor, the courts
have consistently fixed an extremely high and strict standard for
his conduct.7 The duty of loyalty requires, however, more than
mere subordination of personal interest since it is unrealistic to
assume that opportunity for personal benefit will be consistently
disregarded. Thus the law attempts to eliminate all possibilities of
personal profit by preventing the trustee from occupying a position
in which his interest could possibly conflict with that of the bene-
ficiary.' This requirement is not founded on a basic distrust of the
trustee, but on the realistic premise that a man cannot possess total
detachment from his own interests. The conflict may be so subtle
that even the trustee is unaware of its effect on his judgment.
Through the application of the rule of undivided loyalty the trustee
has been prevented from buying trust property at his own sale,'
selling his individual property to himself as trustee, 0 using the trust
property for his own benefit,"1 depositing trust funds in its own
banking department,12 purchasing an adverse interest from a third
party,13 and receiving a commission on a transaction in performance
of the trust. 4 North Carolina is in accord with the above princi-
ples 5 and in addition has codified the rule against self-dealing in a
'2 Scorr, TRuSTS § 170 (1956).
'Ibid.; BOGERT, TRusTs § 95 (4th ed. 1963).
See Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 H!v. L. REV. 521 (1936).
' See note 6 supra.
2 ScoTr, TRUsTs § 170.1 (1956).
1oId. § 170.12.
11Id. § 170.17.
1 Id. § 170.18.1oId. § 170.21.1,Id. § 170.22.
"See Trust Co. v. Johnson, 269 N.C. 701, 153 S.E.2d 449 (1967)
where the court recognized "that one of the most fundamental duties of the
trustee throughout the trust relationship is to maintain complete loyalty to
the interests of his cestui que trust." Id. at 711. The court continued by
stating that "[i]n this jurisdiction there have been few inroads on the rule
regarding the duty of loyalty by the trustee to the interests of the cestuis que
trust." Id. at 711. Accord, Morehead v. Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d
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number of specific areas.'
A number of the powers set out in the North Carolina act are
quite broad. These powers allow the trustee great leeway in the
administration of the trust and permit him to occupy positions that
are inconsistent with the fiduciary principles outlined above. Yet
this fact does not in itself present a problem, for it is widely held
that the undivided loyalty rule may be waived by the settlor and in
certain circumstances by the beneficiary.' 7 As will be pointed out
below, the incorporation of at least one power in the North Carolina
act will result in such a waiver by the settlor. 8 Since the draftsman
can, however, refuse to incorporate a power if not in accord with
the settlor's intent, and since even the broadest power may be de-
sirable in certain situations, the new act can be utilized to its fullest
extent with a minimum of problems through prudent and responsi-
ble draftsmanship. Yet despite the opportunity for selective incor-
poration, it should be recognized that as a practical matter the vast
majority of trust instruments handled by corporate trustees in North
Carolina incorporate the act in toto.'9 This fact makes it necessary
to determine whether the powers analyzed are appropriate in prac-
174 (1964) ; Miller v. McLean, 252 N.C. 171, 113 S.E.2d 359 (1960) ; Trust
Co. v. Barrett, 328 N.C. 579, 78 S.E.2d 730 (1953); Erickson v. Starling,
233 N.C. 539, 64 S.E.2d 832 (1951); Hatcher v. Williams, 225 N.C. 112,
33 S.E.2d 617 (1945); Williams v. Hooks, 199 N.C. 489, 154 S.E. 828
(1930) ; Carter v. Young, 193 N.C. 678, 137 S.E. 875 (1927) ; North Caro-
lina R.R. v. Wilson, 81 N.C. 223 (1879); Freeman v. Cook, 41 N.C. 373
(1849).
6 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-26 to -30 (1966). The latter subsection
which prevents a corporate trustee from purchasing its own stock should be
kept in mind throughout the following discussion of the power of the cor-
porate trustee to retain its own shares. Note that a number of these prohibi-
tions cannot be waived by the settlor in the terms of the trust nor by the
consent of the beneficiary. Purchase of its own stock by a corporate trustee
is included in these non-waiver provisions. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-40,
41 (1966). A court of competent jurisdiction may, however, relieve the
trustee from these restrictions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36-42 (1966).
"' See BOGERT, TRUSTS § 95 (4th ed. 1963); 2 ScoTT, TRusTs §§ 170,
170.9 (1956).
1" See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
" This fact was determined by personal communication with trust offi-
cers of well known North Carolina corporate trustees. Note, however, that
a power or powers may be excepted due to potential adverse tax conse-
quences. For example, the trustee is given a very broad power in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 32-27(29) (1966) to determine what is principal and what is in-
come of the trust. This broadness would seem to jeopardize the qualification
of the property for the marital deduction and consequently a number of
corporate fiduciaries urge the exclusion of this power. See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) (1958).
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tically all situations and whether it can realistically be said that the
settlor intended the consequences which flow from such incorpora-
tion.
The first power that may be incorporated permits the trustee:
to retain for such time as the fiduciary shall deem advisable any
property, real or personal, which the fiduciary may receive, even
though the retention of such property by reason of its character,
amount, proportion to the total estate or otherwise would not be
appropriate for the fiduciary apart from this provision.
20
The rule of undivided loyalty in respect to a retention power gen-
erally arises where the trust estate originally consists in part or in
whole of the corporate trustee's own stock.2 Unless authorized to
retain such stock by the trust instrument, retention by the corporate
trustee is a breach of trust due to the potential conflict of interest
between the trustee and the beneficiary. 22 The possibility of an ac-
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(1) (1966).
"Only the consequences of the incorporation of this provision as to the
duty of loyalty will be discussed.
It should be noted, however, that in addition to loyalty restrictions the
trustee is required to exercise a certain standard of care and will be held
liable despite the power to retain if this standard is not met. See 3 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 230.1 (1956). Apparently North Carolina has adopted the "pru-
dent man rule" as to investments and would apply it to acts of retention
authorized by the above power. See Sheets v. Tobacco Co., 195 N.C. 149,
141 S.E 355 (1928) where the court relied on the traditional statement that
the trustee
is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence man-
age their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income
as well as the safety of the capital to be invested. Id. at 152, 141 S.E.
at 357, quoting from Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.)
446, 461 (1830).
For a review of early cases dealing with the investment power and the
prudent man rule in North Carolina, see Comment, 14 N.C.L. REv. 160
(1936).
Although it is possible for the settlor to waive the requirement of reason-
ableness, it is doubtful that incorporation of this power would have such
a result. The power gives the trustee broad discretion, but generally it is
necessary to give "absolute" or "unlimited" discretion in order to waive
this requirement. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 187, comment i
(1959). For a recent North Carolina case in which the prudent man rule
was not applicable due to the grant of "sole" discretion to the trustee, see
Lichtenfels v. Bank, 268 N.C. 467, 151 S.E.2d 78 (1966). In this case the
court gave great weight to the fact that the power was expressly set out in
the trust instrument. Quaere whether a power that is incorporated and
thus made express should receive the same weight in light of the wholesale
incorporation evident in North Carolina?
22 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543 (2d ed. 1960); 2 ScoTT, TRusTs
§ 170.15 (1956). See generally Annot. 47 A.L.R.2d 187 (1956); Annot. 157
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tual conflict in this situation is obvious since the corporation's offi-
cers may hesitate, consciously or unconsciously, to sell the shares
where such a sale might depress the market value of the stock.2"
Also the sale of the corpus may compete with the desire of the offi-
cers to sell their own stock if there is a limited market.4 This
reluctance to sell may be compounded where the voting power repre-
sented by such shares is in the control of the corporate trustee.25
It is well settled, however, that the retention of such shares may be
authorized by the settlor,2' and there is little doubt that the above
power of retention, if incorporated, would serve as such an authori-
zation." Even though this power does not specifically mention
shares of the corporate trustee, the majority of courts hold that
such a general authorization to retain original investments is suffi-
cient to cover this situation.m It is said that since the settlor was
aware that he owned such shares, it is reasonable to infer that he
intended the general authorization to cover them.2 9 The validity of
this rationale seems questionable unless there is evidence that the
corporate trustee informed the settlor of the potential conflict of
interest created by such a power. It seems highly doubtful that the
A.L.R. 1429 (1945); Annot. 134 A.L.R. 1324 (1941); Scott, Retention of
Its Own Shares by a Corporate Trustee, 57 HAav. L. REv. 601 (1944).
2" See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 170.15 (1956).
2 See Hallgring, The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act and the Basic Princi-
ples of Fiduciary Responsibility, 41 WAstH. L. Rav. 801, 813 (1966). [here-
inafter cited as Hallgring].
2" See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 170.15 (1956).
"8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 170, comment n (1959), 2 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 170.15 (1956).
" There has been ver j little litigation in North Carolina involving
powers of retention. However, the court did evidence a liberal attitude
toward such a power in Young v. Hood, 209 N.C. 801, 184 S.E. 823 (1936).
The testator desired that certain bank stock be retained by the corporate
trustee and authorized such retention by an express provision in the trust
instrument. By a subsequent merger with this bank the corporate trustee
held its own stock under the trust. Since the trust did not originally include
the trustee's own stock, it cannot be said that by the express authorization
the testator intended to waive the rule of undivided loyalty. The court held,
however, that the trustee was not subject to surcharge despite the decline
in value of the stock. Although the testator did desire the retention of the
stock, this case does not seem to be particularly well reasoned from a duty
of loyalty standpoint since the conflict of interest arose subsequent to the
creation of the trust.
The liberality of this decision alone would seem to indicate that North
Carolina will follow the majority in construing a general authorization to
retain original property. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
2" See note 26 supra.
292 Scor, TRUSTS § 170.15 (1956).
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typical settlor intends to waive the rule of undivided loyalty in the
normal situation, yet this is precisely the result of such an incorpora-
tion.10 Waiver of this rule should not, however, be understood as
allowing self-dealing by the trustee. Technically the only conse-
quence of such waiver is that the trustee is allowed to occupy a
position in which there is a potential conflict of interest. But even
though the trustee is prevented from acting in his own interest
despite waiver, the practical affect of the waiver places the bene-
ficiary in a precarious position. The rule of undivided loyalty be-
comes sterile to a large extent where the trustee is permitted to
occupy a position of potential conflict because of the difficulty en-
countered in proving or even in detecting self-dealing. It would be
an unusual case indeed if the trustee could not make an after-the-
fact explanation consistent with the duty of loyalty.
Thus in a very real sense the incorporation of the above power
of retention places the corporate trustee in a totally unrestrained
position. It is true that the large and well known corporate trustee
employs internal sanctions to combat this danger."' Also there is
no actual conflict in the usual case. Yet these facts do not justify
incorporation of such a provision in all or even in the majority of
trust instruments. Where the settlor desires that the corporate trust-
ee hold its own stock," it is likely that he will be more aware of
the potential consequences of such incorporation and will communi-
cate his desire for retention directly to the corporate trustee. But
can it be realistically assumed that in every trust handled by a cor-
porate trustee in North Carolina, the settlor was aware of a potential
conflict of interest yet intended that the stock be retained whether or
" See Annot. 47 A.L.R.2d 187, 268 (1956) ; 90 C.J.S. TRusTs § 248(e)
(1955); see generally Scott, Retention of Its Own Shares by a Corporate
Trustee, 57 HA.v. L. Rav. 601 (1944).
"For examples of suggested guidelines see Aartsen, Statement of Poli-
cies on Conflict of Interest of Corporate Fiduciaries, 103 TRusTs & EsTATEs
379 (1964). Note that Wachovia Bank & Trust Company has employed a
safeguard through which the primary objections to a general authorization
to retain are eliminated. Whenever it appears that Wachovia may have to
hold its own stock in trust, it requests that a specific authorization to do so
be placed in the trust instrument. This is done in spite of the incorporation
of the general power to retain under the North Carolina Act. [This fact
was determined by personal communication with a trust officer of the
Wachovia Bank & Trust Company.]
"For example, the settlor may desire to give the corporate trustee such
a power where the corporate trustee is a close corporation. In this situation
retention of the stock may be very desirable for control purposes and would
act much the same as a stock transfer restriction.
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not administration of the trust is affected by self-interest? The
answer is obvious. Thus it would seem to be arguable that in the
loyalty area an incorporated power should not be accorded the same
weight as a power expressly set out in the trust instrument.
By incorporation into the trust instrument the trustee may also
be given the power
to pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the fiduciary, and
other expences incurred in the collection, care, administration,
and protection of the trust or estate.33
Under this section the trustee is given powers essential to the effi-
cient administration of the trust estate. Clearly the prudent drafts-
man would be expected to incorporate such powers. Yet the refer-
ence made in this power to compensation is somewhat questionable
in light of North Carolina law.
Under the English rule the trustee is not entitled to any com-
pensation for his services unless such compensation is expressly set
out in the trust instrument.3 4 The early North Carolina rule was in
accord with the English view.3 5 Under the modern rule in this coun-
try both corporate and individual trustees are entitled to compensa-
tion whether or not it is provided for in the trust.3 6 The majority
of states, including North Carolina, have enacted statutes that fix
standards under which the trustee is to be compensated. 7 Those
states that have no statute apply the general rule that the trustee is
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(9) (1966). [Emphasis added]. This power
is substantially the same as that set out in the UNirORm TRusTEEs' PowERS
ACT § 3(c) (20). For a detailed analysis and criticism of this power under
the Uniform Act see Hallgring 816.
"3 ScoTT, TRusTs § 242 (1956).
See Boyd v. Hawkins, 17 N.C. 160 (1832), where the court rejected
the argument that trustees were entitled to compensation above reimburse-
ment for expenses. The court recognized that compensation could be ex-
pressly stated in the trust instrument, but such amount was to be taken only
as evidence that the parties did not intend the services to be gratuitious.
Such express provision for compensation was to be disregarded and a
reasonable amount set by the court. In this case the court feared that the
"trustee would take what he pleased of the estate . . . under the name of
compensation, and every abuse would follow." Id. at 174.
" BOGERT, TRusTs § 144 (4th ed. 1963) ; 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 242 (1956).
"7 See N.C. GEx. STAT. § 28-170 (1966), which provides, in part, that
[e]xecutors, administrators, testamentary trustees, collectors or other
personal representatives or fiduciaries shall be entitled to commissions
to be fixed in the discretion of the clerk not to exceed five per cent
upon the amount of receipts . . . and upon the expenditures made in
accordance with the law. ...
Ibid. [Emphasis added.]
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to receive reasonable compensation as determined by the courts."8
Yet despite the traditional judicial and legislative control over fidu-
ciary compensation, a reasonable interpretation of the above power
results in the conclusion that it authorizes the trustee to fix his own
compensation. 9 The existence of a statutory scheme dealing with
fiduciary compensation in North Carolina raises a question as to
whether a trustee could, under the above power, set his compensation
above the statutory maximum of five per cent. Even if he could
not, the question remains whether compensation set by the trustee
within the maximum is entitled to an initial presumption of valid-
ity.40 Seemingly Trust Co. v. Waddel4' would require a negative
answer to the latter question and perhaps to the former. The court
stated in this case that "an executor has no right to fix and deter-
mine the compensation to be received by him.' 42 From this case it
seems to be well settled in North Carolina that unless set by the set-
tlor, the maximum compensation to be received by a fiduciary is
fixed by the statute with the actual amount determined only by the
clerk of court.43 In light of this decision it is difficult to see what
affect incorporation of the above power could have in North Caro-
lina. In addition the power is inherently violative of the duty of
loyalty. It is impossible to conceive of a more obvious case of con-
flict between the interest of the trustee and that of the beneficiary.
It has been appropriately asked: "What trustee will not judge that
his own skills are beyond compare, his energies inexhaustible, and
his difficulties the most vexatious?"" Even a mere presumption of
validity becomes undesirable in light of the obvious self interest and
vague standards applied to determine compensation.45 It should be
"3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 242 (1956).
"See Horowitz 23.
o See Hallgring 818 where it is suggested that such prima facie validity
may be found by a court supervising the exercise of this power under the
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act.
"' 237 N.C. 342, 75 S.E.2d 151 (1953).
"Id. at 345, 75 S.E.2d at 153.
"Note that this statement is not meant to cover situations in which the
settlor or testator set the trustee's compensation in the terms of the trust. In
such a situation compensation exceeding the statutory maximum would be
allowed. See Trust Co. v. Waddell, 237 N.C. 342, 75 S.E.2d 151 (1953).
"Hallgring 818.
"Under the North Carolina compensation statute the clerk is to consider
"time, responsibility, trouble and skill involved in the management of the
estate. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-170 (1966).
For factors generally considered in the absence of a statute see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 242, comment b (1959).
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noted, however, that as a practical matter this problem exists only
as to the individual trustee. The corporate trustee generally uses a
schedule of compensation that is written into the trust instrument.46
The percentages in such a schedule are set primarily by competition
and are well below the statutory maximum. It is clear that even if
the corporate trustee had the power to set its compensation above
that allowed by the statute, it would probably not do so due to the
competitive restraint. But the same is not true of the individual
trustee who could reward himself handsomely. Again, the trustee
would have little difficulty showing reasonableness on an after-the-
fact inquiry. In the final analysis it seems, however, that the North
Carolina compensation statute and the difficulties encountered as to
the duty of loyalty would prevent the trustee from fixing his own
compensation despite incorporation of this power. If this is correct,
the power should be deleted from the fiduciary powers statute. If
not, North Carolina has departed sharply from duty of loyalty prin-
ciples and the considerations deemed decisive against such a power
in the vast majority of states.
The propriety of these powers47 should also be considered in
' 8 For example, the basic schedule used by the Wachovia Bank & Trust
Company for trustees is as follows:
Annual principal charge: (Based on current market value)
$2.00 per $1,000 for the first $100,000
$1.00 per $1,000 for the next $400,000
$0.50 per $1,000 for all over $500,000
Annual income charge: (Based on income received)
5% or the first $10,000
2y2% of all over $10,000
'7 Although the majority of the powers set out in the North Carolina
Act are not overly broad and do not present fiduciary problems, there are
at least two, other than those discussed above, that should be briefly men-
tioned. Both involve the duty of care.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(4) (1966) allows the trustee to invest without
diversification. This power is in conflict with the general rule that requires
the trustee to spread investments so as to lessen the risk of loss. See 3
ScoTr, TRUSTS § 228 (1956). Thus the incorporation of this power would
not seem desirable unless the settlor specifically intends to limit the field of
investments.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(24) (1966) enables the trustee to employ and
compensate agents deemed necessary to advise or assist him and to do so
without liability for any neglect provided the trustee selects and retains the
agent with due care. It is not yet clear how far the trustee could go in
delegating his duties to agents under this section. However, the power
seems to be sufficiently broad to raise some question in light of the general
rule that the trustee cannot delegate acts which he may reasonably be ex-
pected to perform. See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 171 (1956). For a detailed analy-
sis of the duty not to delegate and a criticism of a power similar to that in
the North Carolina Act see Hallgring, 831.
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light of the nature of the modem corporate trustee. The profession-
al fiduciary is replacing the trusted family confidant as trustee in
the modern business world. Despite a general realization that "the
striving for profitability ... should not obscure the traditional prin-
ciples and ideals of trusteeship,"4 the corporate trustee's relation-
ship with the settlor and the beneficiary is becoming increasingly
distant. The primary responsibility for maintaining the standard of
loyalty clearly rests with the corporate trustee and most have set
forth guidelines by which fiduciary principles are strengthened.49
But it is also true that
those entrusted with the responsibility for establishing legal rules
must recognize that the trustee's pursuit of profit necessarily
casts him in a commercial, arms-length, and to some degree ad-
versary, relationship to settlors and beneficiaries; that under con-
temporary conditions, the maintenance of high standards of
fiduciary conduct requires vigilance. 0
The courts and legislatures in responding to the modem trustee's
need for flexibility must not inadvertantly lift fiduciary restrictions.
The same conditions and considerations which demand a broadening
of the trustee's power also demand a strict concept of fiduciary
responsibility. Without the latter the entire concept of the trust
devise will fail. As one authority observed in speaking of an early
financial era,
[M]ost of its mistakes and its major faults will be ascribed to
the failure to observe the fiduciary principle, the precept as old as
the holy writ, that a man cannot serve two masters. . . . No
thinking man can believe that an economy built upon a business
foundation can permanently endure without some loyalty to that
principle.r1
This statement is equally applicable to the present trust era.
The problems discussed above are merely representative of those
that may arise in the loyalty area. The majority of these problems
can be eliminated by responsible and prudent draftsmanship and a
general awareness on the part of the judiciary and legislature that
such problems do exist. The broadness of these powers can be
mitigated without placing undue restraint on the trustee by main-
"Newsoraina, 103 TRuSTS & ESTATES 316 (1964).
"See note 31 supra.5oHallgring 827.
Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1934).
1150 [Vol. 45
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taining high and clear standards under which they must be exercised.
It is in the interest of the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary
that a proper balance be maintained. Codification of such standards
with special emphasis on the corporate trustee52 would aid in achiev-
ing such balance."
JOHN G. ALDRiDGE
Usury-Usury as Applied to Credit Transactions
In Biblical times1 and at the early common law2 the taking of
any interest or compensation for the use of money, whether moder-
ate or excessive, was considered usurious. Laws were later passed
that allowed, but limited, the amount of interest a party could
charge on a loan or forebearance of money.3 In 1821, the case of
Beete v. Bidgood4 established the rule in England that a sale on
credit was not a loan or forebearance of money and hence the laws
against usury did not apply. This view was soon thereafter adopted
in practically all the American courts.' This doctrine allows a ven-
dor to charge one price for a cash transaction and a higher price for
the sale of the same goods on credit. The fact that the credit price
"' Due to the nature of the modem corporate trustee the need to set
separate and higher standards is becoming greater. This need has been
recognized to some extent by those authorities that require a higher degree
of care for the corporate trustee. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§ 174 (1959). Little attempt has been made, however, to set higher stan-
dards of loyalty due to the difficulty of framing such a standard. Thus day-
to-day restraints are usually imposed by the corporate trustee itself. Yet
despite this difficulty it seems that the loyalty concept merits more attention
by law making bodies than it has received.
"As to the duty of care, both Tennessee and Arkansas have codified
the "prudent man rule" as to investments and refer specifically to this stan-
dard in their powers acts. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 58-302 (Supp. 1965);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-320 (1955).
The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act in addition to adopting the prudent
man rule in § 3(a), states in § 5(b) that if the duty of the trustee and his
individual interests conflict in the exercise of a power, such power may be
exercised only by authorization of the court. This restriction excludes, how-
ever, certain powers which are violative of fiduciary principles. For a criti-
cism of these exclusions see Hallgring 812.
'Consolidated Police & Fireman's Pension Fund Comm'n v. Passiac, 23
N.J. 645, 652, 130 A.2d 377 (1957).
'Natonal Bank v. Mechanics' Nat'l Bank, 94 U.S. 437, 438 (1876).
* An Act Against Usury, 1570, 13 Eliz. I, c. 8, § IX.
'7 Barn & Cress 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1821).
'E.g., Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 38 (1861); Carolina Indus-
trial Bank v. Merriman, 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963).
